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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
~f.

KENNETH WHITE,
Plaintiff and Ap pel/ant,

vs.

Case No. 7652

SALT LAKE CITY, a b{uniciptl Corporation, "'
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Comes now Appellant and herewith submits his Reply
Brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
Ownership of property abutting both sides of a street includes ownership of the street itself, subject only to the use
of the same by the public for highway purposes.
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POINT II
The unauthorized laying of a "\Vater pipe line by a municipality in a street outside of its corporate limits, which line in
no way benefits or serves the abutting property, is an additional
burden upon the property, constituting an invasion of the
abutting owner's rights, and is actionable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY ABUTTING BOTH
SIDES OF A STREET INCLUDES OW1~ERSHIP OF THE
STREET ITSELF, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE lJSE OF THE
SAME FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES.
Respondent in its answer brief, cites several cases from
other jurisdictions holding that municipalities own the fee
interest in streets and highways. These cases have no bearing
upon the point under discussion. Here, we are only concerned
'vith the Utah Statutes bearing upon the subject and our own
Supreme· Court decisions construing them.
From Sections 36-1-1 and 36-1-7, U. C. A. 1943, it is
very clear that the public has an easement in streets and highways, and that the abutting owner has the fee title. However,
on the surface, there is an apparent inconsistency with Section
78-5-4, U. C. A. 1943, relied upon heavily by Respondent, \vhich
pr.ovides that the fee to the street passes when a plat of a
subdivision is recorded. But the case of Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake
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County, 104 Pac. 111, cited in Appellanfs original Brief, resolves this apparent inconsistency. This case was dealing with
the abandonment of a street, and the argument of the County
was that inasmuch as the qfee" passed by virtue of Laws of
1890, P. 76, C. 50, the forerunner of Section 78-5-4, U. C. A.
1943, abandonment of the interest in the public could not result
by non-use of the street. It was in ansv..rer to this argument that
our Supreme Court held that the fee to the corpus or the land
did not pass, but only the fee to the surface for public use
as a street or highway. Please also see Hall v. North Ogden
City, 175 P.(2) 703, at Page 713.
The case of Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 Pac. 959, cited in
Respondent's brief, was an action brought as an outgrowth of
the other Sowadzki case. But this case confirms the doctrine of
the other Sowadzki case, by holding that only an easement in
the street is created in the public by the recording of a platted
subdivision.
·
To rebut Appellant's contention, Respondent cites Section
36-;~-3, U. C. A. 1943 which provides for the ((Regulation of
Water and Water Mains, etc.", which is part of Chapter 3,
tcDivision and Use of High\vay .Space." Respondent contends
this enlarges the right of the public in the highway. This section is not designed to describe or enlarge upon the rights
of the public in h~ghway space as set forth in Section 36-1-7,
U. C. A. 1943, but is solely for the purpose of giving control
of the highway, such as it is, to the county commission.
Please see Dailey vs. State (Ohio), 37 N. E. 710, wherein
the court said:
5
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t(The legislature may authorize the construction of
a telegraph line by a telegraph company upon a public
highway, in such a manner as not to incommode the
public in the _use of such highway; but authority so given
does not empower such company to injure the property
of an adjoining landowner, nor to appropriate any of
his property rights in the highway, except upon condition that compensation be first made; ... "
So, in the case at bar, the necessity of securing permission
-of the county commission to lay water mains, etc., does not
carry with it the right to appropriate the property right of the
abutting owner in the highway itself.
Thus, to summarize: The cases from other jurisdictions
do not determine the extent of the public's right in a street or
highway in our state. Such rights must be determined by our
own statutes and Supreme Court decisions construing them.
Our statutes and decisions definitley establish that the fee is
in the abutting owner' with an easement in the public for highway purposes. To hold other~vise would be to ignore our own
statutes and to overturn the decision of the Sowadzki case, supra.

POINT II
THE UNAUTHORIZED LA YI!'JG OF A WATER PIPE
LINE BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A STREET OlJTSIDE OF
ITS CORPORATE LIMITS, WHICH LINE IN NO WAY
BENEFITS OR SERVES THE ABUTTING PROPERTY, IS
AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN UPON THE PROPERTY,
CONSTITUTING _AN INVASION OF THE i\BlJTTING
OWNER'S RIGHTS, AND IS ACTIONABLE.

6
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In ans\vering Point II of Appellant's brief, Respondent
on page 27 of its brief, suggests that the Hofius v. CarnegieIllinois Steel Co. case, 67 NE ( 2) 429, relied upon by Appellant, should be construed 'vith t\vo other Ohio cases, Smith v.
Central Power Company, 103 Ohio 681, 137 NE 159, and
State v. Board of Commissioners of Summit County, 175
NE 590. The latter case held that the county could lay water
lines in a county road where it was for the benefit of the
abutting as \Yell as other owners. But the Ifofius case, decided
in 1946, \vhich 'vas much later, specifically overruled that
particular part of the opinion in the Board of Commissioners
of Summit County case. The Smith and Ho:fius cases establish that in Ohio, the fee interest in city streets is in the municipality, but that in county roads, the fee is in the abutting
owner, with an easement in the public for highway purposes.
However, the Hofius case goes further, as pointed out in Appellant's original brief, and holds that a water n1ain over a
county highway, solely for the benefit of a neighboring village,
is an additional burden on the fee of the abutting owner.
Inasmuch as our own Court, in the Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake
County case, supra, held the fee to be in the abutting owner,
with the public having an easement in the highway for highway
purposes, the Hofius case from Ohio is squarely in point, and
supports Appellant's Point II.
Respondent cites three Kansas cases to the contrary. They
hold that telephone, oil and gas lines constructed by public
utilities in county highways are not additional burdens on the
rights of the abutting O\vner. The earliest of these three, McCann v. Johnson County 1"·elephone Company, 76 Pac. 870,
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which was used as authority for the other two, was a three to
two split decision.
The Oklahoma case cited by Respondent, concerns an oil
line, built by a public utility in a county highway. The 1\.finnesota case cited by Respondent, which used the McCann case,
supra, as an authority dealt with a telephone line in a county
road. It was also a three to two split decision.
Respondent cites an Oregon case, dealing with an unincorporated part of a county, which became incorporated into a
town. This Oregon case contains a quotation from Elliott on
Roads and Streets, which particular quotation is set out in
Respondent's brief, dealing with a street under circumstances.
But in another part of Elliott's text, Third Edition, paragraph
489, page 541, the particular point in the case at bar is discussed under the heading ']llustrative Cases-Pipes in a Country Road" as follows:
~'In

the Pennsylvania case (Sterling's Appeal, 2 Atl.
105, which also was cited in Appellant's original brief)
the court stated with clearness and precision the rights
of the owner of the fee in a country road and said: ~In
other words, the only servitude imposed on the land is
the right of the public to construct and maintain thereon
a safe and convenient roadway, which shall at all times
be open and free for public use as a highway.' If this
premise be granted, and it cannot well be denied, there
would seem to be no doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion that laying gas or water pipes in a country
highway is not a purpose legitimately connected with
the use of the land as a way for public travel ... "
-Two of the cases cited by Respondent under its Point III
contain references to McQuillin on 1\funicipal Corporations,
8
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presumably in support of Respondent's position. However, in
Volume 3 of ~lcQuillin, paragraph 1344, page 2901, there
is footnote No. 96, which refers to Baltimore County Water
& Electric Co.'v. Dubreuil, 105 Md. 424, 66 Atl. 439. At page
440, the court in this case said:
((But the great weight of authority is to the effect that
there is a distinction between the use of streets in cities
and tOWnS for gas and \Vater pipes and the USe of COUntry or rural highways. See 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,
921, 30 lb. 438, 15 CYC. 671, lb. 683, 2 Abbott on
Mun. Cor. 1166, and -Thorton on Oil and Gas, para.
505, where_ many cases v.rill be found in the notes. In
Mackenzie's case, 74 ,l\1d. 47, 21 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St.
Rep. 219, the distinction is recognized and reasons given
for it. In that case it v.ras said of tan ordinary road or
highway in the country' that tall the public acquires is
the easement of passage and its incidents,' and that is
in substance the doctrine announced by most courts.''
Thus, Elliott and 1fcQuillin, together with Tiff any and
the cases cited in Appellant's original brief all support Appellant's position that the laying of the water main in j:he streets
located in the County, as set forth in the Complaint filed in
the instant case, is an additional burden on the abutting fee.
This represents the majority view. The few cases cited by Respondent represent a minority view.'
However, we must consider Respondent's cases further,
for there is a distinction benveen them and the case at bar.
The cases cited by Respondent dealing with the laying of gas,
oil and telephone lines in_ country roads all concern public
carriers and public utilities. Each case included in its discus-
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sion the public nature of the use and the fact that a public
utility was concerned.
But what about the instant case? Respof\dent is not a
public utility. When it placed the water main in the streets
·described in the complaint, it \vas doing so solely for the use
and benefit of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City. The abutting
owner had no right to connect on to the line. Thus, Respondent
actually appropriated a portion of the subsurface of the street
solely for a certain group of people, which is not a public, but
a private use.
Therefore, not even the minority view that country roads
may be used by public utilities and carriers without further
burdening the fee, applies.
Under Point III of Respondent's brief, numerous cases
are cited to support the proposition that although an abutting
owner owns to the center of the street, there is no right to damages for the laying of lines in the street. Each case refers to the
laying of lines in city streets, \vhich is not our problem. Thus,
not one of them is in point.

CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, only two conclusions can logically
be reached.
First, the Appellant owns the fee to the streets in question, subject to the right of the public to use the same f~Jr
highway purposes.
10
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Second, in view of such authorities as Tiffany, Elliott, ~1c
Quillin, and the numerous cases cited, all of which deal squarely
with the point involved in this case, Respondent had no right
to lay the water main in the streets abutting Appellan~' s property, and in doing so is liable for the damage sustained.
Thus, Appellant respectfully urges that this Honorable
Court reverse the judgment of the District' Court.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER and
A. C. MELVILLE,

Attorneys for Appellant.

,
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